TEHRAN – A professor of political science at the University of Vienna has said that the current energy crisis in Europe could be an additional incentive for the European Union to play a more active role in the talks in Vienna over reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, officially known as the JCPOA.

“I think that is an additional incentive for the European Union to become active,” Professor Heinz Gartner said in an exclusive interview with the Tehran Times. 

Following is the first part of the full text of the interview:

Q: Regarding the JCPOA talks, most recently President Raisi met with French President Macron in New York and the French leader was very clear that he is not going to pressure the IAEA to close the files regarding the Safeguards issues. So it seems that Iran is insisting on its position and the E3 - France, Germany and the United Kingdom - are sticking to their position and not pressing the IAEA. In such a climate, do you think there is a stalemate in the talks?

A: Of course, there is a stalemate at the moment. Paradoxically, it’s about these safeguards files and Iran wants the files closed.  And the E3 and director of the IAEA say it’s still open and still want some clarification, so we do have a stalemate. However, I have to say these safeguards issues are not direct part of the JCPOA; something outside of the JCPOA and the issue is twenty years old. Basically, that was not much of a problem in 2015. However, now, some member states and the director of the IAEA insist they have to have some clarifications... indirect link to the JCPOA. It does not refer to this special issue, but it’s an outside issue.

“If there is no JCPOA, to my mind, it would be tragic not only for the nuclear issue but for the whole region, because Israel will cry foul.”I do think it’s paradoxical that an outside issue might be a stalemate for the JCPOA which is unfortunate. To my mind, it’s a minor issue. Of course, it’s important for Iran and it seems to be important for the E3 … to my mind it’s a minor issue which should be resolved. So there are three possibilities: one is that the stalemate will continue and we will not have JCPOA, which would be tragic. The second possibility would be that it will be solved before the JCPOA will be implemented; that would be the best solution.

The third one is a little bit shaky, that they agree to sign the JCPOA and the issue has to be solved within 120 days until JCPOA gets re-implemented; re-implementation, you call it that way. But if then still the IAEA comes and say that’s not solved and the JCPOA is in danger again. So, I don’t know what kind of flexibility is still possible; I’m not an engineer from the IAEA but I assume there are some technical compromises as well which I don’t know what it can be, but I assume that may be possible. Of course, now, all the sides are playing hard and that’s why we have a stalemate, but we have seen Iran has been very flexible in the past when it comes to the IRGC. So I get my guess that it could be solved before the JCPOA will be signed (revived).  

Of course, there are other possibilities, but then we have to have the consequences. If there is no JCPOA, to my mind, it would be tragic not only for the nuclear issue but for the whole region, because Israel will cry foul, then Iran will continue with its nuclear program, Israel would say we knew it all along, they are going for the bomb and having this option B. Option B refers to some military solution in the U.S. I think, some say the JCPOA is only about nuclear, but it’s a lot about the region, a lot about Iran as well.

Q: Regarding Israel, you know it’s a kind of enigma. On the one hand, Israel says it does not want Iran to possess a nuclear weapon and at the same time it says Iran’s nuclear program is designed for a nuclear weapon. And then we have the Europeans and the Biden administration saying that the JCPOA is the only way to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful. So why does Israel, in your opinion, oppose the revival of the JCPOA that its Western allies claim is designed to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful? What is the essence of the policy that Israel is pursuing in respect to the JCPOA and the whole Iranian nuclear program? 

 A: Now I do think that the JCPOA would be the best solution. I’m not saying that Iran is going for the bomb; I’m not saying this, but it would be a solution for confidence-building as well. So, the others would be, if they assume, the U.S. and the Europeans that Iran is going for the bomb. Maybe the JCPOA would be a confidence-building. And they might say okay we have a break here and it might be possible to build other confidence-building measures during the time.

“The issue for Israel is not the JCPOA, not the nuclear issue. The issue is Iran.”So, I do think that JCPOA would be the best solution. We know it all along that Israel opposed the agreement before 2015, so it was Prime Minister Netanyahu who strongly opposed the deal and actually pressed the U.S. Congress and Obama, but Israel was successful with Trump as we know. So, Israel did not entirely change its position. So, it’s not as offensive as Netanyahu was, but still it opposes the deal.

So, euphemistically they say they were not against the deal, but against “this deal,” but they are always against this deal. Israel basically seeks no real compromise at the moment. I don’t know, if we have a deal may be Israel might go along with it as well. So I don’t know why Israel’s position is different from the position of other Western states. So, my assumption is it’s not so much about the nuclear issue, because Israel has, I don’t know (exactly), 200 or 100 nuclear bombs. So, Iran’s one bomb would not be a big thing, I don’t say Iran wants to have one, but it will not be a real danger for Israel and the deterrence would still work.

So, I think it would be a bad thing if they say nuclear arms race; because the Saudis would say the Iranians want to have it. The JCPOA would be better. But the issue for Israel is not the JCPOA, not the nuclear issue. The issue is Iran. The issue is Iran and you can look it up there…, it’s a strange name, can you look it up in the internet? Global Fire Power. And it ranks the military power according to geopolitics strength and position. So they have 30 criteria, so nuclear is not really a criteria here, but all the other geopolitical issues; I just name a few of them: size resources, population, education, land-sea ratio, discipline of the military. No nuclear. No nuclear. No nuclear.  And diversity, and here Iran globally ranks 14th. So, Iran, if you want it or not is a power in the region. So, that doesn’t mean it has to be aggressive, but it has some power here. And it comes way before Israel and before Saudi Arabia.

Q: Before heading to New York, Mr. Borrell sought to lower expectations from meetings that would happen. He said no breakthroughs should be expected from meetings in New York. Do you think this is a kind of media messaging or is it a real assessment of the European Union that even with meetings in New York one cannot break the deadlock that has been created in the talks? Does that mean that Europe has given up and would not make efforts to break the ice?

A: No, no, no, I don’t think so. But I think Europe was not very active in the past. I have to say so. They managed to stay in the deal. They created the INSTEX mechanism which did not really work quite well. But they managed to stay in this deal. They always followed it because it’s a benefit for Europe as well. That would be of benefits for the European Union and Iran. When President Biden said he might go back to the deal in his election campaign, the European Union all of a sudden became active. And they set up the Vienna talks which started in January last year (2021). And the European Union did not play a bad mediating role; not an active role, but not that bad. Because I was in Vienna almost every day before the hotels where the negotiations took place, in the Kung hotel first and then in the Coburg. So, there was all this back and forth. Now we had this stalemate. And now Borrell became very active at presenting his proposal. This was a compromise text. It was basically agreed by all sides, that was a good text, including Iran, including the U.S. It certifies a good text. Of course, then Iran said it wants to have some changes and you know the style; it goes back and forth to the U.S., to the European Union, to Iran. And there was also this meeting in Qatar. Media say it failed; I don’t think it failed, because it was a starting point. 

Q: Borrell was asked if a meeting with Iran will make difference, he said: OK I went to Tehran, I met Iranians and they said OK we will be going to Doha and then went to Doha and nothing happened. That’s a pessimistic tone. 

A: No, it was a starting point for his proposal. And the proposal shows that the European Union has an interest in the agreement. It has an interest. In addition, I have to say, of course, now we have this energy crisis and the European Union might even have more interest, because, of course now Russia’s sanctions, the Russian gas and oil will be limited. So Iran might be a good resource as well. So I think that is an additional incentive for the European Union to become active.

But you always have this, what diplomats usually have to do, this is calculated pessimism because of course Borrell was very optimistic for a while, but now when he goes to New York and say there is no breakthrough, that would be awkward. But New York is such that it will not be a breakthrough. Of course, we know that it has to prepare already all the papers and it has to pre-prepare. So, if there is some progress, the progress should be here already. I don’t know, but, so, maybe there will be some meetings on the sidelines, no official meetings, between U.S. and Iran, may be even that, so I don’t exclude that.

I don’t think the European Union has given up; the European Union was not active enough in the past, but the European Union somehow found out that is has some responsibility. After all the European Union chairs the commission of the JCPOA, so it has some responsibility. And the European Union and Borrell has to accept their responsibility. So, I don’t think they have given up, I don’t think so. I don’t know whether that would be successful, but, so, may be New York, may be a little bit later. A little problem is the mid-term elections in the U.S. of course. 

Q: There have been promises. The Europeans came to Tehran and then went back, but nothing happened. In general, how do you see the role of the European Union and more particularly the E3 in protecting the JCPOA. You said the Europeans have not been a bad mediator. But they were not that active. So, what is your assessment on the role of the E3 and the European Union over the last four years. It has been four years since the U.S. left the deal.  

A: Yeah, I talked a little bit about it already. So, I said it’s not wholeheartedly. But they managed to stay in it. Of course, the Europeans, from the beginning were afraid of the extraterritorial and secondary sanctions by the U.S. So, most of the companies would say the U.S. economy is closer to us than the Iranian economy. So if you don’t want to lose the U.S. market and we don’t want to be hit by the secondary sanctions.

So that was not so much that governments could exercise influence. That’s a decision by the companies. But having said this, I do think the Europeans could have been more outspoken as well. So, first of all, if you say four years, the Europeans could have said right from the beginning that President Trump left the deal in violation of international law, for example … because the JCPOA is based on international law, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. Right? We know this. So, now they are all against Trump, but at that time they were pretty silent. So I would stay in the deal. Secondly, after Biden became president, they still were silent. First of all, President Biden procrastinated, delayed, delayed, delayed. Europeans could have said OK let’s do it now. At least the Europeans set up the negotiations and mediated. But you should have been more outspoken.

They said we have good transatlantic relations, that’s what Europeans said.  So why don’t you lift at least the secondary sanctions against us? That would be possible. So why don’t you trust us? And it would have been an incentive for Iran as well. So that might have been the next possibility. At least ask President Biden to lift these secondary sanctions, why don’t you lift the secondary sanctions? May be first partly and then it will be an incentive for Iran. Europeans could have done so. Thirdly, the next step of, what the Europeans missed on guarantees is not possible, even though Iran says that the Biden administration can give 100 percent guarantee for the next president. But the Europeans could have said if the U.S. leaves the deal as well, we will commit ourselves to our commitments. We commit ourselves to the contract with the companies we have, in spite of possible new secondary sanctions. So that’s what the Europeans could have committed themselves as well. So, to step in as you said, to step in again to give some at least economic guarantees that they could provide. May be also revitalize the INSTEX mechanism. The idea of INSTEX mechanism is not bad but it was not used. 

Q: It has never been implemented. 

A: Yes, not really, that was for transactions. It was considered to be about oil as well.